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Abstract
In exemplar models the similarities between a new stimulus and each category exemplar
constitute positive evidence for category membership. In contrast, other models assume that, if
the new stimulus is sufficiently dissimilar to a category member, then that dissimilarity
constitutes evidence against category membership. We propose a new similarity-dissimilarity
exemplar model that provides a framework for integrating these two type of accounts. The
evidence for a category is assumed to be the summed similarity to members of that category
plus the summed dissimilarity to members of competing categories. The similarity-dissimilarity
exemplar model is shown to mimic the standard exemplar model very closely in the
unidimensional domain. 
Keywords: identification, categorization, similarity, dissimilarity.
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Similarity and Dissimilarity as Evidence in Perceptual Categorization
This paper is concerned with the basic question of what, in models of categorization,
constitutes evidence for category membership. More specifically, is the evidence that a
particular object is a member of a given category based solely on the similarity between the
object and previous category members or is the evidence also based on the dissimilarity
between the object and alternative categories? There are already disparate suggestions in the
literature that difference information may be utilized in recognition, identification, and
categorization tasks. In recognition, Mewhort and Johns (e.g., Johns & Mewhort, 2002, 2003;
Mewhort & Johns, 2000, in press) have argued that, under some circumstances, correct
rejections of test items may be made on the basis of the difference between a test item and list
items, rather than on the basis of familiarity as traditional accounts assume (although cf.
Dennis & Humphreys, 2001). In identification, Murdock's influential (1960) distinctiveness
model assumed that ease of item identification is a function of relative distinctiveness, where
distinctiveness is effectively a measure of the summed difference between the target item and
other contextual items. In Stewart, Brown, and Chater's (in press) model of unidimensional
absolute identification, the difference between the current stimulus and the immediately
preceding stimulus is used to derive a response to the current stimulus. In interpreting
differential reward learning, Estes (1976) explored a model in which rewards associated with a
current choice are compared to recent reward values held in short-term memory. In
categorization, Stewart, Brown, and Chater (2002) and Stewart and Brown (2004) argued
that difference information is used in simple binary categorization tasks. In his contrast model
of similarity, Tversky (1977) argued that the similarity between two objects is a function of the
number of common features and the number of differing or unique features. 
Here we focus on exemplar models and explore the more general question of whether
and when stimulus-category dissimilarity, as well as (or instead of) stimulus-category
similarity, is taken as evidence for category membership. Exemplar models of categorization
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(e.g., Estes, 1994; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986) assume that as exemplars are
encountered they are stored together with their category labels. A new exemplar is classified
with reference to these stored exemplars. Specifically, the similarity between the new exemplar
and each stored exemplar is calculated. Similarities are summed for each category and used as
evidence to support responding with that category label. In this account, even highly dissimilar
exemplars count as (possibly infinitesimal) positive evidence for membership of their category.
An alternative approach assumes that difference information can count as evidence against
category membership (Stewart & Brown, 2004; Stewart et al., 2002). Accounts which use
only similarity information can be experimentally discriminated from those which use
dissimilarity information, as we show in the next section. 
Evidence of the Use of Difference Information: The Category Contrast Effect
Stewart et al. (2002; Stewart & Brown, 2004) provided some experimental evidence
that difference information can count as evidence against category membership. The paradigm
used was unidimensional binary categorization, where stimuli of one category took low values
on the dimension and stimuli of the other category took high values. Stewart et al. found that
classification of a borderline stimulus was more accurate when preceded by a distant member
of the opposite category than when it was preceded by a distant member of the same category.
They called this effect the category contrast effect. Standard exemplar models must predict
either no effect or the opposite result. If the plausible assumption is made that stimuli on
recent trials are weighted more heavily than those on less recent trials (e.g., Nosofsky &
Palmeri, 1997), the effect of the immediately preceding exemplar, no matter how dissimilar to
the current exemplar, is to increase the summed similarity of the current exemplar to the
previous exemplar's category. Thus, according to an exemplar model, a borderline stimulus
should be classified more accurately when it occurs after a distant member of the same
category than when it occurs after a distant member of the opposite category - the opposite of
the category contrast effect that is observed experimentally. 
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Overview
We begin by setting out formal definitions of an exemplar model (the generalized
context model). An adapted exemplar model is then presented and shown to be able to mimic
the original model closely. Exemplar models have been successfully applied to a wide range of
experimental paradigms (see Estes, 1994, for a review), and so the comparison between the
adapted and original models is informative in establishing how well the adapted model will
generalize to other paradigms. Finally we show that the adapted model can account for the
category contrast effect.
The Generalized Context Model
The generalized context model (hereafter GCM) is presented elsewhere (Nosofsky,
1986) but will be briefly described here as it applies to a binary categorization of
unidimensional stimuli. Each stimulus encountered is stored, together with its category label.
The distance between two stimuli, Si and Sj, is defined as
d ij=xi x j (1)
where xi is the absolute magnitude of Si on the psychological dimension. The similarity
between two stimuli is a decreasing function of the distance between them
ij=e
c d ij
q
(2)
where q = 1 gives an exponential function and q = 2 gives a Gaussian function. 
The evidence for each category response is the sum of the similarities to each category
member:
H iA=
x jCA
w jij (3)
where xj   CA is read "for all xj such that Sj is a member of category CA." The GCM can be
adapted to predict sequence effects by weighting the stimuli on more recent trials more heavily
via the wj parameters (e.g., Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997). The wj parameters were omitted in the
original version of the GCM. (These wj parameters are not to be confused with the attentional
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weights that are used in the multidimensional version of the GCM.) In intuitive terms, this
weighting corresponds to the stimulus either being more available in memory or being more
influential in the decision process.
The probability that response RA is given to stimulus Si is a function of Si's summed
similarity to each possible category:
P RAS i =
A H iA 
	
A H iA 
	

B H iB 
	 (4)
where A is the response bias for category CA and 	 is a parameter that varies the degree of
determinism in responding (Ashby & Maddox, 1993). When 	 = 1 the response rule reduces
to the special case originally proposed for the context model (Medin & Schaffer, 1978) and
the GCM. For 	 > 1 responding is increasingly deterministic. There is good evidence that, at
the level of individual participants, it is necessary to include a determinism parameter in fitting
the GCM (Ashby & Gott, 1988; Maddox & Ashby, 1993; McKinley & Nosofsky, 1995;
Nosofsky & Zaki, 2002; Stanton, Nosofsky, & Zaki, 2002; Zaki, Nosofsky, Stanton, &
Cohen, 2003; see also Estes, 1997).
The Similarity-Dissimilarity Exemplar Model
We introduce a new model that we call the similarity-dissimilarity generalized context
model (hereafter SD-GCM). The model incorporates the idea that dissimilarity may play a role
in categorization decisions into the GCM framework. The probability of responding RA to
stimulus Si is a function of the evidences for CA and CB and is given by
P RAS i =
A v A 
	
A v A
	

B v B 
	 (5)
In the SD-GCM the valences for each category are derived from the similarities defined by
Equation 2. Specifically,
v A=
x jC A
w jij

x jC B
w j 1ij  (6)
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where the wj parameters weight each stored exemplar (as in Equation 3 for the GCM).
Equation 6 can be understood as the evidence for category CA being the sum of the summed
similarity to category CA and the summed dissimilarity to category CB. The only difference
between the GCM and the SD-GCM is that the summed similarities to each category have
been replaced with the valences for each category.
When responding is probabilistic (i.e., 	 = 1), the response biases are equal (A = B),
and the exemplar weights are equal, Equations 5 and 6 give:
P RAS i =

x jC A
ij

x jC B
1ij 
N
, (7)
where N is the total number of exemplars. The SD-GCM contains Stewart and Brown's (2002)
memory and contrast model as a special case.
The Relationship Between the GCM and the SD-GCM
The only difference between the GCM and the SD-GCM is that in the GCM summed
similarities to each category are used in the choice rule whereas in the SD-GCM valences are
used in the choice rule. There are no circumstances in which the models are formally
equivalent, except in the trivial case when the dissimilarity information in the SD-GCM (i.e.,
the second term in Equation 6) is ignored. However, the two models are able to mimic one
another very closely. To explore the similarity between the GCM and the SD-GCM we
generated data from each model and fitted the other to it. The category structure used
comprised equally spaced exemplars: specifically CA = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and CB = {6, 7, 8, 9, 10}.
Rather than simulate a series of trials in an experiment, the generating model was used to
calculate the exact probability of an RA response for every exemplar for a range of parameter
values. The error surfaces shown in Figures 1 and 2 represents the mean square error of the fit
of one model to the probabilities of RA responses to each exemplar generated by the other
model. For each model 441 c-	 parameter pairs (corresponding to the nodes in the error-
surface grid) were used for each value of q (recall that q = 1 gives exponential generalization
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and q = 2 gives Gaussian generalization). The range of c parameter values was selected to
encompass very steep through to very shallow generalization gradients (c ranged from 0.05 to
2.72). The range of 	 values was selected to vary from probabilistic responding (	 = 1)
through to a generalization gradient sufficiently steep to allow the models to predict almost
perfect accuracy (	 = 10). Models were fitted in Mathematica 4.2 using the Mead and Nelder
(1968) simplex method with 100 random seeds and the constraints c > 0 and 	 > 1. 
Figures 3A and B show the fits of the GCM to SD-GCM data. At all points modeled
the MSE < .02. There are two reasons why the GCM does not fit the SD-GCM data perfectly,
as illustrated in Figures 1C and 1D. Figure 1C shows SD-GCM data generated from the model
with a large response determinism parameter (i.e., large 	). The GCM is unable to predict
such a steep generalization gradient without at the same time predicting near perfect
performance on all but the borderline training exemplars. (Incorporating guessing into the
GCM, where on a proportion of trials the response is simply guessed, could allow the GCM to
predict this pattern.) Figure 1D shows SD-GCM data generated from the model with a
moderate level of generalization (i.e., moderate c) and probabilistic responding (i.e., 	 = 1).
The GCM is unable to predict the "sine-wave" like generalization gradient, where performance
is better on the category prototypes than the exemplars furthest from the category boundary.
This inability is due to the choice of exponential or Gaussian generalization gradient, rather
than some other function (see Shepard, 1958, 1987, for a theoretical motivation of this
choice). This choice ensures that the similarity of a given exemplar to a near exemplar will
decrease at least as slowly as the similarity to a further exemplar as the given exemplar moves
away from both of them. A hyperbolic generalization gradient does not have this property.
Figures 2A and 2B show the fits of the SD-GCM model to GCM data. At all points
the MSE < .0001. These fits are excellent, with the SD-GCM able to mimic the GCM. This is
because the SD-GCM is able to fit the GCM generalization gradient very closely using the
central portion of its own generalization gradient. Figure 2C provides an example. Within the
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range of the training exemplars the SD-GCM mimics the GCM data very closely. The abscissa
has been extended outside the range of the training exemplars to show that, outside this range,
the SD-GCM and the GCM differ. The GCM predicts deterministic classification, with any
exemplar below the category CA exemplars being classified into category CA and any exemplar
above the category CB exemplars being classified into category CB. The SD-GCM predicts that
when transfer exemplars are sufficiently different from the training exemplars they are equally
likely to be classified into either category; this behavior arises because the dissimilarity
between a test item and both the near and far training exemplars gradually dominates and
approaches asymptote as distance from the training set increases. In the extreme, a test
stimulus becomes very dissimilar from both training sets, and similar to neither. The GCM can
also predict this pattern if a background noise term is added to the numerator and denominator
of Equation 4 (Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998; Wills, Reimers, Stewart, Suret, & McLaren, 2000). 
In the following section we use this property to illustrate how the SD-GCM might be
applicable to the peak shift phenomena. We then show that the SD-GCM allows the basic
dissimilarity-based category contrast effect, described above, to be explained.
The SD-GCM's Account of Peak Shift and Prototype Effects
McLaren, Bennett, Guttman-Nahir, Kim, and Mackintosh (1995) investigated
prototype effects and peak shift in categorization of checkerboard stimuli. They generated two
prototype checkerboards. Training exemplars were then generated for each category by
swapping, at random, some of the squares of the category prototype that differed between the
prototypes. Thus, training exemplars from opposite categories were more similar to one
another than the actual category prototypes were to each other. After training on these
exemplars McLaren et al. examined categorization performance on the old training exemplars,
the (previously unseen) category prototypes, and some new exemplars. These new exemplars
were generated for each category from each prototype by swapping some of the squares that
the two prototypes had in common. Thus new exemplars from opposite categories were more
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dissimilar than the category prototypes. McLaren et al. found that performance was best on
the prototypes, then the new exemplars, and worst on the old training exemplars. 
McLaren et al. interpreted their results in terms of a combination of a prototype effect
and a peak-shift effect. A prototype effect is better performance on unseen category
prototypes than old training exemplars. A peak shift is where, after a discrimination training on
two stimuli, transfer performance on a continuum of test stimuli reveals better performance on
stimuli more extreme than the trained stimuli. The SD-GCM is able to offer an account of
these results. Figure 3 illustrates two generalization gradients for the SD-GCM after training
on two exemplars: CA = {5} and CB = {6}. When the stimuli can be discriminated well (e.g., c
= 1.0), the SDGCM predicts that the peaks of performance lie slightly outside the training
stimuli. As the stimuli become less discriminable (e.g., c = 0.1) they are classified less
accurately, and the peak shift (distance between peaks) is increased. Increasing peak shift with
reduced discriminability is consistent with Hanson's (1969) original demonstration of peak
shift with pigeons. (For alternative explanations see: Lamberts 1996; Palmeri & Nosofsky,
2001.)
The SD-GCM's Account of the Category Contrast Effect
The SD-GCM can predict the category contrast effect. Figure 4 illustrates the
generalization gradient predicted by the SD-GCM for the binary categorization of 10 evenly
spaced stimuli where CA = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and CB = {6, 7, 8, 9, 10}. The central line illustrates
the predictions when all exemplars are equally weighted. The remaining two lines illustrate the
case when more recent examplars are weighted more heavily (where the weighting of the
exemplar k trials ago is given by ek  ). Recall that the category contrast effect is the effect of
a distant stimulus (S1 or S10) on the previous trial on classification of a borderline stimulus (S5
or S6) on the current trial. The probability of responding RA to S5 on the current trial is reduced
when the previous stimulus is S1 (i.e., from the same category). The probability of responding
RA to S5 on the current trial is increased when the previous stimulus is S10 (i.e., from the
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opposite category). This is consistent with the effect observed by Stewart et al. (2002). The
SD-GCM is able to account for the effect because of the way valences for each category are
constructed. Consider Equation 5. A distant stimulus from category CA will increase the vA by
only a small amount (as the similarity between the distant stimulus and the current stimulus is
small), but it will increase vB greatly (as the dissimilarity between the distant stimulus and the
current stimulus is large). Thus the probability of an RA response is reduced. If the distant
stimulus was from category CB then this argument is reversed. In contrast, the GCM cannot
account for this result. Consider Equation 4. A distant stimulus from category CA will increase
the iA by only a small amount (as the similarity between the distant stimulus and the current
stimulus is small), and will have no effect on iB. Thus the probability of an RA response is
slightly increased - the opposite of the category contrast effect.
Conclusion
Exemplar models assume that participants store previously encountered category
exemplars and categorize novel stimuli in terms of their similarity to these stored exemplars. In
the GCM, even if a stored category exemplar is highly dissimilar to a novel stimulus, the
(small) similarity between them counts as (weak) positive evidence that the novel stimulus
belongs to the exemplar's category. In contrast, in the SD-GCM, the same high dissimilarity
counts as evidence that the novel stimulus does not belong to same category as the exemplar
to which it is being compared. That is, the SD-GCM differs from the GCM models in that a
valence, which is the similarity to one category and the dissimilarity to the other, rather than
just the summed similarity, is used as evidence in reaching a classification decision. Because of
this difference, the SD-GCM can account for the category contrast effect that the original
GCM could not account for. The SD-GCM was shown to mimic the GCM very closely, at
least for a symmetrical binary categorization of evenly spaced unidimensional stimuli.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. A, B: Fits of the GCM to data generated from the SD-GCM. C: An example of a
GCM (c = 0.02263, q = 2, 	 = 12.88) fit to data generated from the SD-GCM (c = 0.3679, q
= 2, 	 = 4.000). D: Another example of a GCM (c = 0.009019, q = 2, 	 = 3.961) fit to data
generated from the SD-GCM (c = 2.718, q = 2, 	 =1.000).
Figure 2. A, B: Fits of the SD-GCM to data generated from the GCM. C: An example of a
SD-GCM (c = 0.06840, q = 1, 	 = 8.045) fit to data generated from the GCM (c = 1.000, q =
1, 	 = 1.000).
Figure 3. The probability of a RA response against stimulus magnitude for the SD-GCM (q =
2, 	 = 1) when CA = {5}, and CB = {6}. The different plots are for different levels of stimulus
generalization. 
Figure 4. The probability of an RA response as a function of the current stimulus for the SD-
GCM (c = 0.1000, q = 2, 	 = 1.000). Two of the plots are for when the preceding stimuli
were not equally weighted (k = 0.5000). The final plot is for the predictions of the SD-GCM
when every stimulus is weighted equally.
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Figure 1
A: GCM Fits to SD-GCM Simulated Data (q=1)
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B: GCM Fits to SD-GCM Simulated Data (q=2)
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0ln c 2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
γ
.000
.005
.010
.015
.020
MSE
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
P(
R
A
)
Stimulus
C: An Example of a Relatively Poor GCM
Fit to SD-GCM Simulated Data
SD-GCM Data
GCM Fit
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
P(
R
A
)
Stimulus
D: Another Example of a Relatively Poor
GCM Fit to SD-GCM Simulated Data
SD-GCM Data
GCM Fit
Similarity and Dissimilarity    18
Figure 2
A: SD-GCM Fits to GCM Simulated Data (q=1)
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0ln c 2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
γ
.00000
.00002
.00004
.00006
.00008
.00010
MSE
B: SD-GCM Fits to GCM Simulated Data (q=2)
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Figure 3
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